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RMT helpline 0800 376 3706 :: september/october 2024 :: RMTnews
18
T
he annual reports of the
Rail Safety and Standards
Board (RSSB), the Rail
Accident Investigation Branch
(RAIB) and Office of Rail and
Road (ORR) all carry stark
warning for the railway
industry.
The RAIB even questions
whether the rail industry has
learnt lessons from the 1988
Clapham Junction and 2020
Carmont deadly railway
accidents.
A recommendation from
the Hidden Report into the
Clapham disaster called for
Train Protection Systems – and
the legal requirement for this
system was established 20
years ago.
However, the RAIB refers to
several speeding events not
protected by an engineered
solution of train protection.
Instead, there was complete
reliance on the individual
signaller or driver to react
correctly.
“Train Protection Warning
System (TPWS) fitment was a
stopgap measure while the
railway waited to fit automatic
train protection, which would
bring with it features to
supervise the speed of trains”
and found that despite
decades having passed
“universal fitment of such
technology is a long time
away”.
The RAIB refers to incidents
at Waterloo, Dalwhinnie and
South Wingfield which saw the
integrity of the signalling
system being compromised by
the incorrect application of
processes developed following
the Clapham disaster.
It explained that those with
personal knowledge of
Clapham who know the
importance of safety processes
have retired or moved away
from front line jobs and that
“this has impacted on the
corporate memory vital to
achieving safety”.
FATIGUE
The fatigue section of the
RSSB report focuses on
addressing the problem and
supporting industry trials for
‘driver attention and alertness
technology’. The ORR,
responsible for the economic
and safety regulation, was
concerned about high
numbers of staff working
longer hours than allowed for
in Network Rail (NWR)
standards – and that the
company could reduce this by
addressing staff retention
issues and improving industrial
relations.
Although there were no
accidents, near-misses
continue to happen. Main
causes were trains mistakenly
signalled into line blockages,
and workers on open lines
thought to be in a possession
or line blockage.
There was also a high rate
of earthworks failures
particularly to linked to high
rain fall.
In 2020-2021 NWR
committed to completing
drainage asset surveys by the
end of March 2024. Three
regions met this deadline, but
two – Southern and Eastern –
did not.
It said that NWR had
implemented four of the 18
Mair recommendations but
“struggles to deliver enough
earthworks and structures
examinations”.
There had also been an
increase in the category A
SPADs and the ORR has called
for a committed industry-wide
approach to future train
protection and speed
supervision.
Finally, on Modernising
Maintenance (MM), the ORR
warned that more “needs to
be done in a way that does
not overload people with too
much change too quickly, nor
result in fatigue. An increased
focus on occupational health
risk is also required”.
The ORR also found that
there were high levels of
backlogs and deferrals of
scheduled work, staff working
long hours, and fewer staff to
call on. The ORR said that it
would continue to monitor
MM in the next year.
LESSONS ON SAFETY
STILL NEED LEARNING
Rail industry bodies warn on loss of skills, jobs,
safety and fatigue
CLAPHAM: Rail
safety bodies warn
lessons from the
1988 Clapham
Junction and 2020
Carmont deadly
railway accidents still
to be learnt