RMT helpline 0800 376 3706 :: september/october 2024 :: RMTnews 18 T he annual reports of the Rail Safety and Standards Board (RSSB), the Rail Accident Investigation Branch (RAIB) and Office of Rail and Road (ORR) all carry stark warning for the railway industry. The RAIB even questions whether the rail industry has learnt lessons from the 1988 Clapham Junction and 2020 Carmont deadly railway accidents. A recommendation from the Hidden Report into the Clapham disaster called for Train Protection Systems – and the legal requirement for this system was established 20 years ago. However, the RAIB refers to several speeding events not protected by an engineered solution of train protection. Instead, there was complete reliance on the individual signaller or driver to react correctly. “Train Protection Warning System (TPWS) fitment was a stopgap measure while the railway waited to fit automatic train protection, which would bring with it features to supervise the speed of trains” and found that despite decades having passed “universal fitment of such technology is a long time away”. The RAIB refers to incidents at Waterloo, Dalwhinnie and South Wingfield which saw the integrity of the signalling system being compromised by the incorrect application of processes developed following the Clapham disaster. It explained that those with personal knowledge of Clapham who know the importance of safety processes have retired or moved away from front line jobs and that “this has impacted on the corporate memory vital to achieving safety”. FATIGUE The fatigue section of the RSSB report focuses on addressing the problem and supporting industry trials for ‘driver attention and alertness technology’. The ORR, responsible for the economic and safety regulation, was concerned about high numbers of staff working longer hours than allowed for in Network Rail (NWR) standards – and that the company could reduce this by addressing staff retention issues and improving industrial relations. Although there were no accidents, near-misses continue to happen. Main causes were trains mistakenly signalled into line blockages, and workers on open lines thought to be in a possession or line blockage. There was also a high rate of earthworks failures particularly to linked to high rain fall. In 2020-2021 NWR committed to completing drainage asset surveys by the end of March 2024. Three regions met this deadline, but two – Southern and Eastern – did not. It said that NWR had implemented four of the 18 Mair recommendations but “struggles to deliver enough earthworks and structures examinations”. There had also been an increase in the category A SPADs and the ORR has called for a committed industry-wide approach to future train protection and speed supervision. Finally, on Modernising Maintenance (MM), the ORR warned that more “needs to be done in a way that does not overload people with too much change too quickly, nor result in fatigue. An increased focus on occupational health risk is also required”. The ORR also found that there were high levels of backlogs and deferrals of scheduled work, staff working long hours, and fewer staff to call on. The ORR said that it would continue to monitor MM in the next year. LESSONS ON SAFETY STILL NEED LEARNING Rail industry bodies warn on loss of skills, jobs, safety and fatigue CLAPHAM: Rail safety bodies warn lessons from the 1988 Clapham Junction and 2020 Carmont deadly railway accidents still to be learnt