RMT helpline 0800 376 3706 ::september 2022 :: RMTnews 21 The runaway of a road-rail vehicle at Belle Isle Junction, north London in May last year was caused by an incomplete risk assessment undertaken following a modification to the machine to fit a direct rail wheel braking system. The Rail Accident Investigation Branch also found that the company responsible did not have a thorough understanding of the unmodified machine or its original conversion for rail use. The runaway occurred at around 03:30 hrs on Sunday May 16, 2021 while being on- tracked at a road-rail access point near Belle Isle Junction in north London. The RRV ran downhill for approximately 600 yards before coming to a stop in a tunnel. Although no one was injured, the operator jumped from the road-rail vehicle before it entered the tunnel. Raising memories of the Tebay disaster in 2004, the road-rail vehicle ran away because it entered service with ineffective rail-wheel brakes and staff working with it were unable to stop the runaway. The brakes were ineffective because a valve in the braking system had been left open following maintenance. The possibility of this had not been recognised during the design or risk assessment of the brake system, and the situation had not been identified during operation or regular in-service testing. RAIB ordered the company which designed and fitted the direct rail wheel braking system to revise its process for risk assessment. It also ordered to the owner of the machine to review its strategy for confirming the ongoing integrity of the direct rail wheel brake system. Two more learning points were identified, to reinforce the importance of organisations which design and implement changes to on-track plant sourcing the original design information to inform their decisions and of those supplying and operating road- rail vehicles ensuring that suitable facilities are available for in-service testing. Following a near miss at Sileby, the Rail Accident Investigation Branch has made two recommendations covering fatigue risk management and managing the risks of trains with lower braking rates. At about 05:29 hrs on May 5 2021, a train made up of machines used for reprofiling (grinding) rails passed a signal at danger (red) at Sileby Junction, between Leicester and Loughborough, resulting in a near miss with an empty passenger train travelling in the opposite direction. The passenger train had cleared the junction less than 10 seconds before the rail grinding train reached it. There were no injuries or damage, but the incident resulted in delays to several trains in the area. The incident was caused by two factors. Firstly, the driver did not control the train’s speed to be able to stop at the signal at danger, probably due to fatigue. Secondly, although the train’s systems made an automatic emergency brake intervention, this did not stop the train before it reached a point at which it could collide with another train. A probable underlying factor was associated with the fatigue risk management processes used by the train operator. Three learning points were identified addressing the use of napping as a fatigue mitigation, the importance of organisations sharing safety- critical information when employees move between companies and railway procedures for post-incident management. RAIB has also made four observations on safety implications. The first observation identified that there was no system-wide risk assessment to control the risk of overruns arising from the operation of non-standard vehicles on the national rail network. The second observation noted that the train operator did not obtain safety-critical information about the driver when he joined the company. The remaining observations related to industry processes for managing the operational and technical response to such incidents. RUNAWAY AT BELLE ISLE JUNCTION Owner of a runaway road-rail vehicle told to ensure integrity of the brake system NEAR MISS AT SILEBY Fatigue contributed to a near miss between a rail grinding train and an empty passenger train