PERFORMANCE ABOVE TRACK SAFETY

RMTnews :: april 2006 :: www.rmt.org.uk 8 Proposals for significant changes to track safety rules on the main line railway are shortly to be issued for industry wide consultation. The union fears will only increase the risk to the safety of workers undertaking day to day track maintenance. The changes are being presented under the guise of a ‘rules simplification’, but they also include a proposal to expand the activities that can be undertaken with minimal safeguard for the workers in order to improve productivity. Rule Book Module T12 provides for a form of track worker protection which basically involves the signaller holding the controlling signal at danger. When first introduced many years ago, this form of protection was limited to activities such as walking to site, setting up protection systems, track inspections or placing/removing equipment associated with a temporary or emergency speed restriction. Neither was it allowed to involve more than six people. However, some two years ago a change was introduced to Module T12 which widened the number of activities that could be undertaken using this form of protection provided they did not affect the safety of trains, involve more than six people, take longer than 30 minutes, and no other form of protection was suitable. Now they want to extend its use even more by stripping away most of these restrictions, even though the risks involved are all too plain to see. To provide protection, T12 requires the COSS to know the details of where the activity is to take place and, therefore, the protecting signal to be held at danger, and to effectively communicate this information to the signaller. It also requires the signaller to then ensure a train has not already been signalled to approach the worksite, and after granting the T12 continue to hold the signal at danger until given up by the COSS. But as the industry’s own briefing document admits, there have been a number of near misses since T12 activities were extended. This extension of T12 will also override the need for a separate T2X procedure and should be withdrawn. T2X is only used when the signaller requires staff to be called out to attend to a fault that is affecting the passage of trains, and again involves protecting the staff by placing signals to danger. However, the difference between this and a T12 is the fact that the signaller would normally know the site of the failure, and this has provides an additional safeguard against two of the major risk factors. With a more mobile workforce and a large influx of contractors, poor geographical knowledge is a significant issue. Even the requirement for pre- planning of work (RIMINI) does not overcome this failing in all cases, as it also depends on the correct information and the competence of the planner in using it. To further compound these shortcomings, the rule change proposals include withdrawing the requirement of a site diagram where more than two running lines or points are involved. New research shows that communication error concerning the site of work has played a major role in about 38 per cent of trackwork incidents in recent years. Communicating wrong or incomplete information is the most common type of error (35 per cent), and underlying problems frequently involve making incorrect assumptions about other people’s situation, intentions or knowledge. Another error that can lead to a lack of protection involves the signaller failing to check if there is a train already in section before granting the T12, or having granted it simply forgetting to apply a reminder device and then signals a train into the protected area where staff are working. Since the use of the T12 procedure was extended there have been four such recorded instances, any one of which could have caused a multiple fatality. Ironically, the one restriction on the use of T12 to remain is where the work may endanger the safety of trains, such as where work with a crane or other mechanical equipment will foul the line. In these circumstances, one of the T2 forms of protection must be used instead. These still involve the signal being held at danger, but with additional safeguards provided as well. For example, in the case of a T2H it also requires a possession limit board and detonators to be placed at the protecting signal. It would seem employers are happy to propose a simplified form of protection where only the lives of workers are at risk, but demand additional safeguards where it might involve death or injury to passengers, or even damage to trains. Network Rail did not want to talk to the union about the changes until we challenged them. Now they have offered to consult the union once the proposals are formally published, so if members have any views about the changes please let me have them. AGS Mick Cash looks at proposals for significant changes to rail track safety rules PERFORMANCE ABOVE TRACK SAFETY?